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Abstract Despite the extensive body of literature that aims
to explain the phenomenon of consumer scams, the struc-
ture of information in scam relationships remains relatively
understudied. The purpose of this article is to develop an
agency-theoretic approach to the study of information in
perpetrator–victim interactions. Drawing a distinction
between failures of observation and failures of judgment in
the pre-contract phase, we introduce a typology and a set of
propositions that explain the severity of adverse selection
problems in three classes of scam relationships. Our anal-
ysis provides a novel, systematic explanation of the
structure of information that facilitates scam victimization,
while also enabling critical scrutiny of a core assumption in
agency theory regarding contract design. We highlight the
role of scam perpetrators as agents who have access to
private information and exercise considerable control over
the terms and design of scam relationships. Focusing on the
consumer scam context, we question a theoretical
assumption, largely taken for granted in the agency liter-
ature, that contact design is necessarily in the purview of
the uninformed principal.
Keywords Consumer scam  Fraud  Agency theory 
Information asymmetry  Adverse selection  Contract
design
Introduction
Would you believe the authors of this paper are former
Nigerian generals who will soon contact you by email
regarding 45 million dollars we had to leave behind when
we fled the country? The money comes from our invest-
ments in offshore oil. If you can send us $1000, we are
prepared to pay you $200,000. Your money will be pooled
with that of others to pay our agents to enter Nigeria and
bring out the money, which is hidden just inside the border.
Absurd? It turns out that in 2015 alone, 1.2 million indi-
viduals fell victim to scams in the U.S., accounting for an
estimated loss of $765 million (FTC 2016). Consumer
scams involve the deception of individuals who voluntarily
choose to participate in an exchange on the promise of
receiving tangible or intangible goods, services, or finan-
cial returns that are never to be provided or are grossly
misrepresented (NFA 2013). Product, service, Ponzi, and
email scams are examples of this increasingly pervasive
class of transactions that manipulate victims in modern
developed economies.
Over the past three decades, the individual characteris-
tics of consumer scam perpetrators and their victims have
been the subject of extensive, multidisciplinary debate.
Age, nationality, culture, psychological disposition, irra-
tionality, and cognitive bias have been proposed as core
individual-level explanations by psychologists, behavioural
economists, and criminologists (Lea et al. 2009; Mears
et al. 2014; Tippett 2014). Distinct scam contexts, such as
dating scams (Whitty and Buchanan 2012; Whitty 2013),
written communication scams (Carter 2015), email scams
(Isacenkova et al. 2014; Konte et al. 2009), and online
auction scams (Aleem and Antwi-Boasiako 2011; Ramesh
et al. 2014; Wall 2007), have also received attention, along
with investigations into regional specifications—e.g. within
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the USA and Australia (Langton and Baum 2010; ABS
2012).
In addition to individual-level and context-specific
studies, others have focused on scam structure more gen-
erally, though this literature is relatively sparse. This
research analyses scams as a function of the relationship
between individual victims and perpetrators, focusing, for
example, on interactions between victims and perpetrators
(Button et al. 2009; Langenderfer and Shimp 2001; Lea
et al. 2009), and on the role of narrative (Akerlof and
Shiller 2015; Langenderfer and Shimp 2001; Whitty 2015).
The role of information has also received some attention,
specifically in relation to investment scams (Chen et al.
2016; Evans et al. 2013; Ghent et al. 2016).
Despite these recent contributions, the study of infor-
mation in the literature on consumer scams remains largely
a background feature and a ‘‘sideshow’’, as opposed to a
pivot of inquiry (Akerlof and Shiller 2015: 166). Little
academic work systematically examines the structure of
information in consumer scams. This is especially so dur-
ing the initial, pre-contract phase, when perpetrators design
their schemes and make contact with potential victims.
Understanding the structure of information in this initial
phase is important, since a well-designed scam can take
advantage of asymmetric information to bait prospective
victims, irrespective of individual characteristics, cognitive
capacities, and contextual variations. In other words, given
the right scam design, it is possible to scam perfectly
rational victims.
The purpose of this article is to highlight the perpetra-
tors’ role in controlling and manipulating information in
their interaction with prospective victims. We draw on
agency theory to carry out our examination of consumer
scams. In a principal–agent model, two parties interact, one
party (the agent) acts ‘‘on behalf of’’ the other (the prin-
cipal), and the agent ‘‘is supposed to advance’’ the prin-
cipal’s goals (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 170). In a
principal–agent model of consumer scams, the informed
perpetrator (agent) carries out a task on behalf of the
uninformed victim (principal), and the perpetrator aims to
appear as though they are promoting the victim’s goals.
Since information asymmetries often exist before the scam
interaction begins, scam victims face an adverse selection
problem. We introduce three classes of adverse selection
relationships between scam perpetrators and victims—
blind-spot, homoious hemin, and wardship. Drawing on a
distinction between ‘‘observation’’ and ‘‘judgment’’ (Mit-
nick 1996) in the pre-contract structure of information, we
generate a set of propositions about the relative severity of
adverse selection, and, ceteris paribus, the relative oppor-
tunities for perpetrators to carry out scams.
Our analysis of scams through the lens of agency theory
highlights core features of the structure of information that
facilitate scam victimization. Beyond shedding new light
on the phenomenon of consumer scams, this article also
offers a vantage point from which to critically evaluate a
core assumption that has not yet received much attention in
the literature on agency theory. As we demonstrate, in their
roles as informed agents, perpetrators manipulate unin-
formed victims by convincing them to enter adverse
selection relationships. Failures of observation and/or
judgment are intentionally embedded into these adverse
selection settings. The victim’s (principal’s) role in con-
tract design is thus reduced to a symbolic function, while
the perpetrators exercise genuine influence over the inter-
action. In contrast, in the standard principal–agent model,
uninformed principals are assumed to be in charge of
contract design. In this manner, our work scrutinises the
nature of contract design in consumer scams alongside
other applied contexts, e.g. professional services, where the
agency-theoretic assumption of contract design has
received similar critical attention (Sharma 1997).
Our article is structured as follows: The ‘‘Agency The-
ory: Overview’’ Section provides a theoretical overview of
agency theory, followed by a definitional discussion of
consumer scams in the ‘‘Consumer Scam: Our Definition’’
Section. In the ‘‘Perpetrators as Agents’’ Section, we pro-
pose a typology of core consumer scam relationships and
generate three propositions regarding the severity of
adverse selection and the opportunities to carry out scams.
The ‘‘Adverse Selection Severity and Relative Opportuni-
ties to Carry Out Scams’’ Section puts forward a typology
of adverse selection relationships, and the ‘‘Contract
Design, Consumer Scams, and the Principal–Agent
Model’’ Section discusses contract design in consumer
scams and its implications for the literature on agency
theory.
Agency Theory: Overview
Agency theory is a dominant approach in the economic
study of organization and management. A comprehensive
review of the multidisciplinary literature on agency theory
is beyond the scope of this paper—see Mitnick (1992) for
an overview of the theory’s prominent ancestry, Pratt and
Zeckhauser (1985) for a general introduction, Laffont and
Martimort (2009) and Salanie´ (2005) for game- and con-
tract-theoretic overviews, Eisenhardt (1989) for a man-
agement and organization theory introduction, and Heath
(2009) for a discussion of common theoretical abuses. Our
approach to agency involves the application of game theory
to the analysis of principal–agent interactions. This stream
of agency theory has sometimes been referred to as the
‘‘principal–agent’’ approach (Jensen 1983) or the ‘‘risk and
asymmetric information’’ approach (Mitnick 1992, p. 79),
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given the dominant role of information economics and of
agency risks in this literature. Below, we provide a partial
overview of the basic features of this approach as they
pertain to our current investigation.
A principal–agent model consists of two parties. One
party (the principal) designs a contract, making a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to the other party (the agent). The contract
constitutes the implicit or explicit agreement of the terms
of interaction between the two parties. If the terms of the
contract are agreed upon, the agent is supposed to carry out
a service on behalf of the principal and in return receive
some compensation. Principals are by definition assumed
to have the bargaining power to dictate the terms of the
contract. The principal’s task is to design a compensation
scheme that attracts a sufficiently capable agent and effi-
ciently motivates her to deliver high-quality services.
Making this compensation decision is a non-trivial
exercise for principals given certain background condi-
tions. We mention only three essential conditions here:
goal incongruity, information asymmetry, and contract
design.1 Goal incongruity in the principal–agent interaction
results when the agent and the principal have different or
conflicting interests, and so the agent’s preference regard-
ing performance of services does not match the principal’s
preference. Information asymmetry results when, in com-
parison with principals, agents possess superior informa-
tion regarding their own abilities, preferences, effort levels,
and services. In other words, agents have access to private
information—information that is not available to princi-
pals. This can be problematic because the principal—not
the agent—is in charge of contract design: the principal
makes decisions regarding the structure and terms of
interactions, and extends a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
agent. The agent then decides whether to accept or reject
the contract. Thus, the principal is supposed to exercise
influence over defining the terms of the interaction, but her
task becomes difficult when the agent has divergent inter-
ests and has access to private information.
Consumer scams are an ideal context for the study of
principal–agent models, since perpetrators have an infor-
mation advantage over naı¨ve prospective victims. Further,
perpetrators and victims’ interests are incongruent—the
former wins at the expense of the latter in a successful
scam. As we will demonstrate, however, while principals
are supposed to design the contract and set the terms of the
interaction according to the principal–agent model, this
role assignment is reversed in the context of consumer
scams. Perpetrators (agents) exercise influence over their
prospective victims instead. We elaborate on this feature of
the consumer scam principal–agent relationship in the
remainder of the paper.
Consumer Scam: Our Definition
A consumer scam involves an intention to deceive an
individual who chooses to participate in an exchange on the
promise of receiving tangible or intangible goods, services,
or financial returns that are never to be provided or are
grossly misrepresented (FBI 1984; NFA 2013; OFT 2006;
Titus and Gover 2008). The terms ‘‘fraud’’, ‘‘con’’, and
‘‘swindle’’ are typically used synonymously with ‘‘scam’’.
Product scams involving tangible goods include ‘‘miracle’’
health cures and phony gemstones, and also fraudulent
lotteries, prize draws, sweepstake games, and auction sites
(Chua and Wareham 2008). Product scams involving
intangible goods include bogus job offers and work-from-
home arrangements, as well as dating scams that romance
victims and coax them into sending money to potential
marriage partners. Service scams include fake psychics and
home repairs (Cohen 2006; Levi 2008). Scams that promise
financial returns include ‘‘Nigerian 419’’ advance-fee
scams that persuade individuals to part with money in
anticipation of larger returns (Smith 2009), and Ponzi or
pyramid schemes that use early investors to recruit subse-
quent investors, with the contributions of the latter used to
pay off the former (Frankel 2012; Trahan et al. 2005). All
of these scams also lend themselves to online implemen-
tation, and the internet has become the predominant
domain for scamming (Cross et al. 2014).
According to Akerlof and Shiller (2015), all deceptive
or manipulative economic activity that gets people to do
something that is not in their own interest is fraudulent, as
it involves ‘‘phishing’’ (scamming) for ‘‘phools’’ (victims).
Under their broader definition of fraud, one can include
scams that reach far beyond consumers. Examples include
scams involving academic dishonesty (e.g. students
cheating or falsifying applications, university professors
misrepresenting research results), lying on mortgage or job
applications, embezzlement, employee theft, medicare
fraud, and tax evasion (NFA 2013). These types of scam
are beyond the scope of this paper.
Additionally, not all scams are directed at individuals.
Some scams are carried out against private, public, or non-
profit institutions or collectives of individuals. To narrow
our focus, we discuss only individual-level scams. Our
study also does not apply to industry and market-level
analyses, such as the subprime mortgage crisis or to
deceptive advertising and lobbying practices. Finally, note
that our definition stipulates that victims choose to partic-
ipate in an interaction with the perpetrator. We do not focus
1 Other core assumptions in this stream of agency theory are risk-
aversion on the part of agents and the presence of uncertainty (Arrow
1985; Dees 1992). We do not discuss these and other background
conditions since our argument does not address them directly.
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on one-sided attacks, such as identity-theft schemes,
phishing for people’s passwords or account numbers,
unauthorized billing of purchases, slamming (unauthorized
switching of long-distance services by phone carriers), or
the distortion of financial reports to confuse stockholders
and potential investors.
Perpetrators as Agents
Consumer scam interactions share certain fundamental
background assumptions and conditions with principal–
agent models. One typical feature is asymmetric informa-
tion. In consumer scams, as well as principal–agent mod-
els, the agent has access to ‘‘private’’ information—useful
information that is different and not worse than the prin-
cipal’s (Rasmussen 2007, p. 51). Principal–agent problems
are subdivided into two categories—‘‘adverse selection’’
and ‘‘moral hazard’’ (Arrow 1985; Laffont and Martimort
2009). In adverse selection problems, the agent is informed
and the principal is uninformed prior to signing the agency
contract (Bolton and Dewatriopont 2005; Hart and Holm-
stro¨m 1987; Husted 2007; Maskin and Riley 1984; Laffont
and Martimort 2009; Rasmussen 2007; Salanie´ 2005). In
consumer scams, information asymmetry often exists at the
outset, before the scam interaction begins, so the victim
faces an adverse selection problem.2 Consider an example
from HR. Employers (principals) prefer to know about the
talent, qualities, and potential of an employee (agent)
before they hire her. The employer may propose a con-
tractual arrangement to the potential employee. The
potential employee knows her own ability, suitability, and
opportunity costs from the start, but the employer does not
have access to this information.
Adverse selection has great explanatory power and can
be fruitfully applied to a range of social-scientific prob-
lems. To outline the structure of information in an acces-
sible manner, we make a distinction between
‘‘observation’’ and ‘‘judgment’’ (Mitnick 1996).3 Some-
times, the underlying issue in adverse selection is that the
individual cannot ‘‘gather’’, ‘‘possess’’, or ‘‘monitor’’ cer-
tain kinds of information (Mitnick 1996). Other times, the
foundational issue is that separate from whether the prin-
cipal faces failures of observation, she fails to make an
‘‘evaluation’’ or ‘‘judgment’’ regarding the significance or
relevance of information (Mitnick 1996). The principal
cannot make sense of information about, for example, the
agent’s motivations and qualities, even when she has the
relevant information at her fingertips, possibly because she
lacks specialized knowledge or technical skills.4
In a consumer scam, perpetrators (agents) have access to
private information. The interests of principals and agents
are incongruent, and the motivations and characteristics of
perpetrators (agents) cannot be adequately vetted by vic-
tims (principals). Prior to entering an interaction with
perpetrators, victims may lack information about the per-
petrators’ relevant qualities and motivations (observation).
Alternatively, victims may have access to relevant infor-
mation regarding the perpetrator, but they may not be able
to adequately evaluate the significance or relevance of this
information (judgment). Depending on the specific con-
sumer scam, observation, judgment, or both, can be rele-
vant to the relationship. Table 1 presents a typology of the
structure of information in adverse selection relationships
based on a distinction between observation and judgment.5
It may appear that a necessary condition of judging a
piece of information is the ability to observe it, and so it
may seem that it is not possible to encounter a failure of
judgment without at the same time encountering a failure
of observation. But this is not what we mean by judgment.
To clarify, consider a recent rental scam common in large
metropolitan areas (Johnson 2016), whereby scammers rent
an apartment for one night (e.g. on Airbnb) and then pre-
sent themselves as the property owner trying to rent the
2 In technical terms, the problem of adverse selection is one of
‘‘hidden knowledge’’ (Arrow 1985). The agent has access to
information that is not available to the principal (Laffont and
Martimort 2009, pp. 12, 37). The principal moves first as a
‘‘Stackelberg leader’’ under asymmetric information, anticipating
the agent’s subsequent behaviour and optimizing accordingly within
the available set of contracts (Laffont and Martimort 2009, p. 39;
Salanie´ 2005, p. 6). The principal faces moral-hazard problems if
information is symmetric when the contract begins but becomes
asymmetric afterwards. The problem of moral hazard typically is one
of ‘‘hidden action’’ (Arrow 1985). The agent takes an action
unobserved by the principal within a given contract (Laffont and
Martimort 2009, p. 12). Consumer scams can involve both moral-
hazard and adverse selection problems, but given our emphasis on the
structure of information that facilitate scams, this paper will focus on
adverse selection.
3 Mitnick (1996) has argued that the failures of ‘‘observation’’ and
‘‘judgment’’ can be studied alongside each other as ‘‘defining
dimensions to clarify different behavioural problems’’, including
both moral hazard and adverse selection. In contrast, we draw on
observation and judgment to highlight structural features of informa-
tion within adverse selection. Although our use of these terms and the
typology we produce in Table 1 bear a resemblance to and are
inspired by Mitnick’s (1996) work, we would caution readers against
assuming them to be identical.
4 Darby and Karni (1973) note that when contracting there are
observation and judgment problems that make scams possible. They
call these the experience and credence qualities of a good. However,
their use of these concepts differs from ours in two ways. First, a good
cannot exhibit both experience and credence qualities at the same
time, as they’re mutually exclusive. Second, the experience and
credence qualities are relevant post-contract, but the focus of this
article is pre-contract.
5 To be clear, the failures of observation and judgment occur pre-
contract and pertain to information, not behaviour.
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property long-term via another venue (e.g. Craigslist). The
scammer shows the property to unsuspecting, prospective
renters, and, if they are interested, asks for them to transfer
a deposit to their account. By the time the renters realize
that this is not the actual owner and that they will not be
acquiring the property, their money is long gone. One may
be experienced in renting apartments, and thus have con-
siderable expertise when it comes to judging a rental’s
desirability and value. But in this case, the inability to
observe certain information (e.g. the true owner, the actual
status of the property, etc.) creates the problem. We discuss
the structure of ‘‘can judge but cannot observe’’ cases,
along with two other kinds of scam relationship, in more
detail below.
Wardship Relationships
When an uninformed victim (principal) fails to observe and
also fails to judge information prior to contracting, she is in
a wardship relationship. The victim fails to gain access to
relevant information, and at the same time cannot properly
evaluate or understand the information that she does pos-
sess. In comparison with a symmetric information model,
wardship interactions exhibit severe adverse selection. The
perpetrator (agent) is the party who has access to private
information, and she can design a wardship relationship
with prospective victims.
Proposition 1 In the wardship relationship, where the
principal cannot observe and cannot judge, adverse
selection is severe. Ceteris paribus, this design offers
ample opportunities for perpetrators to carry out scams.
Consider the Canadian mining company, Bre-X. Start-
ing in 1995, Bre-X began promoting the Busang gold mine
despite minimal evidence about the presence of the pre-
cious metal. The Busang mine was located in the equatorial
jungle on the Indonesian island of Borneo, a place so
remote that anthropologists study the indigenous tribes
because of their infrequent contact with the outside world.
When the company claimed that Busang held 71 million
ounces of gold, hundreds of thousands of investors put their
savings into the venture and the Bre-X share price rose
exponentially (Francis 1997; Goold and Willis 1997). For
these investors, the Busang mine’s location posed a chal-
lenge of observation, while their ignorance about mining
investments posed a challenge of judgment. Eventually,
when a joint venture was announced to extract the gold,
other mining companies entered the picture (Hutchinson
1998). One partner was Freeport McMoran Corporation,
which already had operations in Indonesia. They sent some
of their mineralogists to Busang to test samples from the
site. Thus, post-contract the relationship shifted from
wardship to a symmetric information structure. No gold
was found. Within a couple of days, $5 billion worth of
stock value in the joint venture had been lost, and Bre-X
was forced into bankruptcy (Naylor 2007).
In this kind of scam, if an investor cannot observe and
judge relevant information prior to the commencement of a
contract, then adverse selection is severe. In modern times,
most gold readily accessible to prospectors has already
been found and extracted, and so the task of prospecting for
new veins is a laborious and inexact process. Thus, success
stories in gold mining often begin the way Bre-X did—
with the sudden discovery of gold in a very remote loca-
tion. It was plausible that Bre-X genuinely had the poten-
tial to produce profits. Given the complications of mineral
exploration, and in the absence of third-party survey
reports prior to commencing the contract, the perpetrators
were in a position to design an interaction with victims that
had severe adverse selection so that both observation and
judgment were impaired. Since perpetrators can exercise
considerable control over the structure of information in
wardship relationships, they have a good opportunity to
lure their prospective victim into the scam.
Homoious Hemin Relationships
When an uninformed victim (principal) cannot judge but
can observe, she finds herself in a homoious hemin rela-
tionship. While the victim appears to possess the relevant
information she needs about the perpetrator prior to con-
tracting, she fails to decipher it or make sense of its sig-
nificance.6 In comparison with symmetric information
Table 1 Adverse selection relationships
Principal can judge information Principal cannot judge information
Principal can observe information Symmetric information Homoious Hemin
Principal cannot observe
information
Blind-spot Wardship
6 In Plato’s parable of the cave, the den dwellers can see, but cannot
understand what they see. What they can sense with their eyes are
phenomena, which are, at best, only representational of the noumenal
realm beyond. Socrates says these den dwellers are ‘‘like ourselves’’
(homoious hemin), suggesting that their status is indicative of the
human condition, i.e. seeing but not comprehending (Plato, Republic
VII, 515a5). And while we do not wish to make any such sweeping
epistemological claim that people see (observe) but do not understand
(judge), we think Plato’s parable can aptly characterize this one cell
of our typology.
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interactions, homoious hemin involves moderate adverse
selection. The perpetrator (agent) is the party who has
access to private information, and she can design a ho-
moious hemin relationship with prospective victims.
Proposition 2 In the homoious hemin relationship, where
the principal can observe but cannot judge, adverse
selection is moderate. Ceteris paribus, this design offers
moderate opportunities for perpetrators to carry out scams.
An example of homoious hemin is the sale of phony
gemstones. Consider Jack Hasson, a con man who worked
out of West Palm Beach, Florida. He sought out wealthy
clients on golf courses, who were interested in purchasing
precious jewels, usually both as an expensive gift and as an
investment. Two of his clients were professional golfers
Jack Nicklaus and Greg Norman. The gemstones Hasson
sold were very high quality replicas, good enough to fool
anyone but a professional appraiser, but worth only about
10% of their quoted value. The gemstones bore certificates
ostensibly from Bvlgari, Cartier, Tiffany, and other credi-
ble premium jewellers, but were printed from Hasson’s
computer. Before commencing their relationship, Hasson
would typically loan a few genuine stones to prospective
clients, and encourage them to take the gems in for
appraisal. Once their quality was confirmed, Hasson would
then begin to sell his victims the fake gemstones (Naylor
2010). The relationship was thus structured as homoious
hemin, involving the problem of judgment.
Sooner or later, someone with expertise in the good
being provided would be drawn in. Either the perpetrator
mistakenly approached such a person as a potential victim,
or a current victim would boast to the expert, or try to do
them a good turn by bringing them in on the deal. On the
few occasions when he was caught, Hasson would pretend
mortification, take back the jewels, and issue a complete
refund to placate the customer. These refunds amounted to
merely a minor inconvenience to Hasson as long as he was
allowed to continue operating. Nicklaus and Norman each
spent about $500,000 on Hasson’s fake gemstones, the
latter on stones worth less than $10,000 (Naylor 2010). The
scam finally came to an end during a routine insurance
appraisal of Nicklaus’s property (Lambert 2000; US v.
Hasson 2003; Wilson 2000). Since perpetrators can exer-
cise a fair degree of control over the structure of infor-
mation in homoious hemin relationships, they have a
moderate opportunity to lure their prospective victim into
the scam.
Blind-Spot Relationships
When an uninformed victim (principal) cannot observe but
can judge, she finds herself in a blind-spot relationship.
Here, the victim does not have access to or cannot observe
relevant information prior to contracting. The victim has
the capacity to fully evaluate and understand the infor-
mation needed to make a good decision but she cannot
observe, so there is a gap in her information set. In com-
parison with symmetric information interactions, in blind-
spot interactions, adverse selection is moderate. The per-
petrator (agent) is the party who has access to private
information, and she can design a blind-spot relationship
with prospective victims.
Proposition 3 In the blind-spot relationship, where the
principal cannot observe but can judge, adverse selection
is moderate. Ceteris paribus, this design offers moderate
opportunities for perpetrators to carry out scams.
Dating scams are a category of consumer scams that rely
heavily on the failure of observation (Whitty and Buchanan
2012). About 85% of dating scams are run online (Ross and
Smith 2011). The CEO of one dating site estimates that
about 10% of dating profiles are fraudulent—not merely in
regard to some trivial fact like the person’s weight, but in
their entirety (Murray 2013). ‘‘John Scofield’’, whose real
identity is still not known, was one such perpetrator.
Debbie Best of Montana fell for him. Best had dated
throughout her adult life, but never married. Upon turning
50, she decided it was time to try a dating site. John con-
tacted her immediately, telling her she had a beautiful
smile. They began their romance by corresponding on
Facebook and over the phone. However, she was never
able to meet him directly. The pre-contract information
structure of interaction was thus blind-spot, since given
Best’s dating experience she may have not entered this
interaction if she had had access to more information about
Scofield than was available from his online dating profile.
Sometime after Best’s interaction with Scofield began,
requests for money were made, first in small amounts, and
then for increasing sums. Scofield even told Best a story
about needing money to travel back from Nigeria where he
had gone to buy artefacts for his antique shop. According to
one study, the average financial loss for dating victims was
$17,500, with scams averaging three months in length
(Ross and Smith 2011). Best beat the odds, losing only
$1500 before cluing into Scofield’s scam (Best 2012).
Once Scofield’s actions began to be perceived as suspicious
by Best, she recognized that she had been missing some
critical information before entering the relationship. Sco-
field had access to private information prior to commenc-
ing the interaction and had used the online dating platform
to design a blind-spot relationship. Since perpetrators can
exercise a fair degree of control over the structure of
information in blind-spot relationships, they have a mod-
erate opportunity to lure their prospective victims into the
scam.
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Adverse Selection Severity and Relative
Opportunities to Carry Out Scams
Bre-X, the phony gemstones, and the dating scam can now
be compared in view of their relative adverse selection
severity and the relative opportunities for perpetrators to
carry out scams. Due to the failures in observing and
judging information, adverse selection in wardship (Bre-X)
is the most severe. The jewellery and dating scams exhibit
relatively moderate levels of adverse selection, since they
each involve only one of the failures of judgment or
observation. In these examples, in comparison with Bre-X
stockholders, victims can successfully judge or observe the
claims made by perpetrators. Since failures of observation
and judgment each pose separate, unique challenges, we do
not make a comparative statement regarding the adverse
selection severity of homoious hemin and blind-spot
structures. A final note about ‘‘symmetric information’’:
since neither the failures of observation nor judgment arise
here, this relationship does not have the potential for
adverse selection. Consider, Table 2, which is a variation
of Table 1 (typology of adverse selection relationships)
that includes scam-specific details.
This typology is informed by one of Mitnick’s (1996)
insightful contributions to agency theory—that information
asymmetry is not a monolithic concept; rather, it involves a
critical distinction between failures of observation and
judgment. Our use of this distinction with respect to the
structure of pre-contract information produces a fine-
grained analysis of the structure of information asymmetry
as it pertains to consumer scams. With both observation
and judgment in play, it is possible to see that varying
levels of adverse selection exist in the three classes of
relationships we have discussed. Perpetrators in turn have
varying opportunities to carry out scams in these relation-
ships, since they can design adverse selection scenarios that
involve observation and judgment pitfalls.
This view stands in contrast to work on scams that has
focused on psychological and cognitive behavioural vari-
ables. Personality traits, cognitive impairment (such as
depression and dementia), cognitive bias, and bounded
rationality have been highlighted in these mostly psycho-
logical findings.7 These studies, be they theoretical or
empirical, tend to point in one direction—a failure of
human rationality—to explain the phenomenon of con-
sumer scams.
Only a few articles have so far examined information
asymmetry as an explanatory variable in consumer scams.
These articles predominantly focus on investment fraud,
and information asymmetry between investors and man-
agers (e.g. Coric 2011; Evans et al. 2013; Ghent et al.
2016).8 This literature suggests that scam victimization
may not necessarily involve a failure of human rationality.
Rather, scams can be explained as involving a deficit in
serviceable information. The point is simple, but worth
emphasizing: when information is asymmetric, it is possi-
ble to scam perfectly rational victims. This paper’s three
proposed classes of adverse selection relationships have
established a theoretical account of this position. We do not
think that psychological variables are unimportant, but
consumer scams may sometimes be as much about infor-
mational asymmetries as about failures of rationality. Our
typology of adverse selection relationships in consumer
scams promotes the study of information in scams gener-
ally, beyond the specific context of investments fraud,
where the topic has begun to receive some attention.
Contract Design, Consumer Scams,
and the Principal–Agent Model
So far, we have drawn on the principal–agent model to
study the structure of information that facilitates consumer
scams. We now consider whether the principal–agent
model itself can be critically evaluated in view of its
applicability to consumer scams. Agency theory has a
number of background conditions and assumptions that
affect its application. In the ‘‘Agency Theory: Overview’’
Section, we mentioned three of these conditions: asym-
metric information, goal incongruity, and contract design.
As we saw in the ‘‘Perpetrators as Agents’’ and ‘‘Adverse
Selection Severity and Relative Opportunities to Carry Out
7 Studies include personality traits such as fantasy proneness
(Langenderfer and Shimp 2001; Whitty 2013), interpersonal influence
susceptibility (Ganzini et al. 1990; Langenderfer and Shimp 2001;
Naylor 2007), and social-status fulfilment (Fischer et al. 2013;
Holtfreter et al. 2008; Ross and Smith 2011); cognitive impairment
(Langenderfer and Shimp 2001; Pinsker et al. 2011), and cognitive
biases (Cialdini 2007; Fischer et al. 2013; Gabaix and Laibson 2006;
Kahneman and Tversky 1984).
8 Less-informed investors are exploited by better-informed managers
when the latter are quick to release good news and slow to release (or
actually conceal) bad news about a firm (Kane 2003). Additionally,
investors have been defrauded when a firm’s finances are complicated
by balance-sheet items that do not yet have standardized accounting
procedures governing their reporting (Nwogugu 2004), when they
involve numerous diversified operations creating a labyrinthian flow
of the firm’s finances (Ghent et al. 2016), or when they involve arcane
laws (Coric 2011). Similarly, investment fraud has been associated
with newer securities that lack sufficient history to establish risk
profiles (Akerlof and Shiller 2015), or more-established securities that
trade too infrequently to gather sufficient statistics on them (Evans
et al. 2013). Outside the investments literature, Kurland (1991)
discusses how information asymmetry may lead to opportunism in the
case of commissioned sales agents who have goals (due to their
incentive structure) that may conflict with the principals (customers)
they serve.
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Scams’’ Sections, asymmetric information and goal
incongruity unproblematically apply to the study of con-
sumer scams. We now discuss the applicability of contract
design, the third key element in the principal–agent model,
to understanding consumer scams.
In agency theory, principals are uncontroversially
defined as the party in charge of designing and outlining
the principal–agent contract (Laffont and Martimort 2009;
Bergen et al. 1992; Bosse and Phillips 2016; Eisenberg
1976; Eisenhardt 1989; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983;
Salanie´ 2005; Walsh and Seward 1990; White 1985). This
assumption is shared across the various streams of agency
theory. In this view, principal–agent relationships involve a
top–down structure of interaction: the principal is defined
as the dominant party who governs the agency interaction.
The principal is in charge of designing the terms by which
the agent carries out services on her behalf, not the other
way around. This assumption about contract design is such
an implicit part of the principal’s role in the standard
principal–agent model that the applied literature on agency
theory for the most part does not identify it as a noteworthy
background condition.
What do we know about contract design in the context
of consumer scams? Does one party employ the other to
carry out a service on her behalf? Yes, the victim hires,
assigns tasks, or makes a similar sort of economic
arrangement with the perpetrator, who is supposed to carry
out certain tasks or services, and is purportedly supposed to
promote the victim’s interests. In the principal–agent
model, the uninformed party is by definition the principal,
and the informed party the agent. So the scam victim can be
viewed as the uninformed principal who asks the informed
perpetrator (agent) to carry out certain services. Notice,
however, that in contrast to the standard principal–agent
model, the victim (uninformed principal) is not the domi-
nant party in charge of contract design. In fact, conversely,
it is the informed perpetrator (agent) who schemes and
designs the interaction and makes appropriate arrange-
ments. In contrast to the standard model, where the prin-
cipal (uninformed victim) should be in charge of contract
design, the agent in consumer scams (informed perpetrator)
is the party that exercises meaningful control over contract
design in this context. We have established three variations
in such control through our propositions about different
adverse selection scam relationships.
The empirical literature on consumer scams confirms the
dominant contract design status of informed perpetrators
(agents). Consumer scams follow a recognizable modus
operandi (Langenderfer and Shimp 2001), briefly summa-
rized as follows: At the outset, experienced perpetrators
script their work and map out the steps they need to take
(Levi 2008). A narrative that accounts for the something-
for-nothing benefits of the scam is composed (Akerlof and
Shiller 2015). In the meantime, preparations may be made
to provide or sell some genuine goods or services to build
credibility for the operation. Well-planned scams even
organize imitation customer-service units to handle com-
plaints (Naylor 2010). To hook the victim, classic sales
tactics, such as time-limited offers, reciprocation, and
social proof (if others in your peer group are buying into a
deal, it must be genuine) (Cialdini 1984) are employed.
Scams are thus not unlike a legitimate, albeit aggressive,
sales operation (Naylor 2010).
Perpetrators exercise influence over contract design and
go one step further by misrepresenting the wage they
deserve. The standard principal–agent model view puts
principals in charge of designing contracts with only one
constraint: the agent’s compensation must equal or exceed
the utility she would have received from her next best-
known alternative, i.e. her ‘‘reservation utility’’ (Ras-
mussen 2007). The value of the agent’s reservation utility
is typically stipulated in a given principal–agent model,
and agents are assumed to refuse a contract that has an
expected value below their reservation utility. In consumer
scams, this means the victim is supposed to compensate the
perpetrator with a wage that surpasses the perpetrator’s
next best alternative wage. To be sure, scam perpetrators
are compensated much more handsomely than their reser-
vation utility. Perpetrators lie, misrepresent facts, and
manipulate their victims into believing that the services
they promise to provide (if they are provided at all) are
worth much more than they in fact are.
Thus, victims can hardly be said to have bargaining
power or occupy a dominant role in the victim–perpetrator
relationship. If victims believe they exercise genuine
influence over the design of the scam contract, they are
Table 2 Victim–perpetrator adverse selection relationships
Victim can judge information Victim cannot judge information
Victim can observe
information
Symmetric information Adverse selection Opportunity for scam = moderate
(precious gemstones)
Victim cannot observe
information
Adverse selection Opportunity for scam = moderate
(dating scam)
Adverse selection/opportunity for scam = severe (Bre-X)
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deluded. Within wardship, homoious hemins, and blind-
spot relationships, perpetrators present victims with a
convincing, ready-to-use principal–agent mould—a narra-
tive for how their interactions will be structured—and
adverse selection is intentionally embedded within this
mould. The victim’s (principal’s) contract design role is
thus reduced to a symbolic function, while perpetrators
exercise genuine influence over the interaction.
Implication for Agency Theory
The literature on agency theory is multidisciplinary and
includes various approaches. The game-theoretic approach
to agency theory that we have so far discussed in this paper
pertains primarily to the problem of asymmetric informa-
tion and agency risks in market interactions (Arrow
1963, 1985; Knight 1921; Marschak 1955; Ross 1973). A
separate, dominant approach to agency is as a positive
theory for analysing economic activities, predominantly
focused on corporate governance and ownership issues
within the firm (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Fama 1980;
Jensen and Meckling 1976). In this approach, a funda-
mental task of principals is to influence agents so that
agency costs incurred by differing organizational goals and
interests are limited (Eisenhardt 1989). While these two
agency approaches have developed separately and have
different trajectories, the more recent ‘‘ownership of the
firm’’ literature on agency theory increasingly engages with
the role of information. This involves examining when an
agent’s private information incurs agency costs and inef-
ficiencies, and exploring optimal solutions that the princi-
pal may adopt to cope with the agent’s opportunism in the
face of asymmetric information (e.g. Bosse and Phillips
2016; Heath 2009).
When information is analysed in agency-theoretic set-
tings, irrespective of differences in streams and approa-
ches, agents are defined as the informed party and
principals as the uninformed one. In the management and
economic-organization literature, uninformed principals
are commonly viewed as the dominant party (as owners,
shareholders, CEOs, etc.) who set the terms of the inter-
action (e.g. Bosse and Phillips 2016; Eisenhardt 1989;
Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling
1976; Newton 1992; Walsh and Seward 1990). In the light
of our discussion of consumer scams, however, we believe
the matter of dominance over the terms and design of the
principal–agent interaction requires critical treatment. The
uninformed principal may control contract design formally,
but the informal and implicit process of interaction may
entail effective control by the informed agent, as in the
context of the consumer scam. In other words, the agency-
theoretic roles of principals and agents need not be asso-
ciated with a fixed, explicit stance about dominance or
control. A similar line of argument is supported by the
work of certain agency scholars who separate organiza-
tional employment functions from agency roles (Husted
2007; Salanie´ 2005; Laffont and Martimort 2009). These
scholars have called for a move beyond strict principal/
employer—agent/employee role assignments. Drawing on
our agency-theoretic analysis of consumer scams, we
believe this flexibility and revision should be extended
beyond agency roles to agency authority and dominance. In
other words, not only can agents take the role of employers,
they can also exercise contract design control over the
principal–agent interaction.
What would this flexibility around contract design entail
for agency theory in the management and organization
studies literature? Suppose the expert employee and her
employer are facing a severe adverse selection problem.
Who exerts control over the structure of this interaction? In
the pre-contract stage, the potential employees may come
up with ways to exert influence over contract design, given
the prevailing adverse selection. In the market for high-
tech services, for example, it is not uncommon for spe-
cialists to approach businesses or individual consumers and
provide them with solutions to the problems they did not
know they faced. Take ads for apps or tools for managing
information security, for example. These are in effect
moulds and narratives for principal–agent relationships
whereby the informed agent approaches the uninformed
principal and offers to provide a service. Often the service
recipient might not know she needs that service—the new
updated Facebook app features, the novel Android pay
function—until the service is offered to her. A more fluid
stance about contract design and control over the terms of
principal–agent interactions would enable us to analyse
such settings using agency theory. This would help make
systematic sense of a wider range of social and economic
interactions using the lens of agency theory.
It is noteworthy that one stream of research on agency
theory where this relationship between asymmetric infor-
mation (though not adverse selection) and contract design
has received some attention is the literature on professional
services (Sharma 1997). Professional experts exercise
considerable ‘‘power’’ (Freidson 1970; Larson 1977) in the
professional–client relationship even though they are ser-
vice-provider agents in relation to the uninformed clients
(principals). Their high level of specialization and their
social and economic privileges have long imparted pro-
fessionals with authority and autonomy over the design of
the client-professional principal–agent contract. To be sure,
professionals differ from scam perpetrators. The prototyp-
ical professional service involves serving the interest of
clients, in exact opposition to the prototypical consumer
scam, which involves manipulating and taking advantage
of victims’ trust. Nevertheless, the shared structure of
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information and interaction exhibit a uniform adverse
selection structure, as well as a lack of meaningful control
on the part of principals (uninformed clients/victims).9
Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical perspective for studying
the structure of information and the role of perpetrators as
agents in consumer scams. The multidisciplinary literature
on consumer scams has thus far focused primarily on indi-
vidual characteristics and specific scam contexts, and less so
on the general structure of information in scam relationships.
We have provided an agency-theoretic approach to the study
of scam relationships and their adverse selection problems.
Agency theory’s attraction in this context lies in its capacity
to help us think clearly about the structure of information that
facilitates manipulative scamming relationships. Specifi-
cally, the interaction—whereby one person (the agent) is
supposed to carry out certain tasks on behalf of the other (the
principal)—is appropriate for the study of consumer scams
since this is precisely the principal–agent mould/narrative
the victims fall for.
Recall the Nigerian general email scam mentioned at the
outset of the paper. How might our proposed approach
explain that scam? The victim is the uninformed principal
and the email sender is the informed agent. The email
sender prepares a principal–agent mould (resembling
wardship), and embeds it with adverse selection. The
principal (victim) encounters adverse selection through (1)
a failure of observation, since she may not possess enough
information about the email sender (the perpetrator’s
criminal record, for example), and (2) a failure of judg-
ment, since the victim may not have the ability to assess
investment opportunities, the military’s access to wealth,
and the political situation in Nigeria. Notice that the fail-
ures of judgment and observation in the structure of
information occur before the agency contract commences
(adverse selection): the email sender is lying about her
honourable intentions, but the victim cannot see through
this before they send off their savings. Although the prin-
cipal (victim) is technically in charge, the impact of the
adverse selection relationship renders this control merely
symbolic. This wardship relationship entangles victims in
severe adverse selection and provides opportunities to
perpetrators for defrauding their victims.
Beyond enhancing our understanding of the phe-
nomenon of consumer scams, this paper has questioned a
core assumption in agency theory. While contract design is
the formal prerogative of the principal in principal–agent
models, in practice this role appears to be under the
influence and guidance of the agent (the scam perpetrator)
in consumer scams. This structure parallels the profes-
sional–client agency relationship, where the informed
professional is an agent who acts on behalf of uninformed
clients, and exercises considerable authority over the terms
and structure of the interaction. This is a largely neglected
line of investigation in the literature on agency theory,
unlike the more popular assumptions of opportunism and
self-interest/expected utility maximization that have been
subject to extensive critical debate. A promising area for
future research might involve a comparative study of these
two different contexts and their shared adverse selec-
tion/contract design features, as part of a larger study of the
agency structure of consumer services in modern devel-
oped economies.
Some agency theorists have argued for a separation
between agency roles and employment functions. After all,
an employee might fulfil the agent’s or the principal’s role
at any given time, depending on the context. In a similar
vein, we question the automatic assignment of the function
of control and authority to principals, as opposed to agents,
in the principal–agent model. Our analysis of the consumer
scam context has provided some evidence in support of this
line of argument. This revised stance about contract design
has interesting implications for ongoing debates about the
normative structure and justification of principal–agent
relationships, for example in relation to the concept of
authority (e.g. Donaldson 2012; Heath 2009).
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